The technical terms which have been commonly used in discussing the mind-body problem, terms such as monism and dualism, interaction and epiphenomenalism, can be convenient; but they are highly ambiguous. So I have tried to make as clear as I can in what sense I take such terms to be applicable to Aristotle’s views. If I have expressed or implied personal opinions on the problem itself, my object has been not to buttress my interpretations of the Aristotelian texts, but rather to declare an interest or prejudice.
In what Aristotle says about human nature we find combined or juxtaposed a biological view of man as one animal among others and a Platonic, or near-Platonic, view of man as a spiritual or mental entity in association with a living body. It has been thought that Aristotle could not have adopted the former view without abandoning the latter. The two views are, therefore, to be regarded not as two elements in one doctrine but as two doctrines held at different times. This interpretation has plausibility. But my prejudice is against accepting it, at least without first trying out the idea that Aristotle never regarded acceptance of the biological view or point of view as involving the rejection of the doctrine that a man’s mind, or an element in it, is in some sense independent of his body. My reason for this prejudice is that the phenomena to be saved, the apparent facts, do not point clearly to any single, and certainly to no simple, solution of the problem. It should not, therefore, surprise us to find Aristotle implying that, if we are to ‘save the appearances’, we must try to have it both ways.
Hardie, W.F.R., Aristotle’s Ethical Theory [kap. 5,, “The Nature of Man”; appendix] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), s. 92-93