Fr. Frederick C. Copleston om morallova, menneske og dyr

I’m not suggesting that God actually dictates moral precepts to the conscience. The human being’s ideas of the content of the moral law depends entirely to a large extent on education and environment, and a man has to use his reason in assessing the validity of the actual moral ideas of his social group. But the possibility of criticizing the accepted moral code presupposes that there is an objective standard, and there is an ideal moral order, which imposes itself (I mean the obligatory character of which can be recognized). I think that the recognition of this ideal moral order is part of the recognition of contingency. It implies the existence of a real foundation of God. (…)

I see no reason to suppose that an animal has a consciousness or moral obligation; and we certainly don’t regard an animal as morally responsible for his acts of disobedience. But a man has a consciousness of obligation and of moral values. I see no reason to suppose that one could condition all men as one can “condition” an animal, and I don’t suppose you’d really want to do so even if one could. If “behaviorism” were true, there would be no objective moral distinction between the emperor Nero and St. Francis of Assisi.

Kjelde:
Fr. Copleston vs. Bertrand Russell: The Famous 1948 BBC Radio Debate on the Existence of God. Henta frå Seckel, Al (red.), Bertrand Russell On God and Religion (Prometheus Books) (30.11.2007)

One comment on “Fr. Frederick C. Copleston om morallova, menneske og dyr

  1. ivarbjoe says:

    Veldig interessant. Åhh, du har blitt “tagga” av meg! Sjekk ut bloggen min for mer info.

    Ivar

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